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ABSTRACT—Once a federal prosecutor obtains an indictment that 
seeks a forfeiture, a judge must permit the prosecutor to freeze all the 
potentially forfeitable assets that would be unavailable at the time of 
conviction. Obviously, funds used for the defense would fit into that 
category. Equally obvious is the tension between the government’s interest 
in assets that may be forfeitable and a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to choice of counsel. A number of lower courts therefore had permitted 
defendants to seek release of the assets needed for a defense by challenging 
the grand jury’s determination that probable cause existed to believe crimes 
subjecting the assets to forfeiture have been committed. Denying such a 
hearing permits the prosecution to decide both that a defendant should face 
trial and should do so without his counsel of choice. In an opinion that 
therefore seems somewhat shocking, the Supreme Court in Kaley v. United 
States rejected the defendants’ claim that they had a Sixth Amendment 
right to such a hearing. A different decision, however, would have required 
lower courts to determine what amount of potentially forfeitable assets 
could be released to fund a defense. Either courts would have released the 
amount of money that would be provided for an indigent, thus still 
effectively denying the right to counsel of choice, or courts would have 
identified a greater amount of money needed for a private defense, 
highlighting the justice gap between rich and poor. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court recently ruled, in Kaley v. United States, that 
defendants have no opportunity to challenge grand jury findings that lead to 
pretrial restraint of potentially forfeitable assets they would use to retain 
counsel.1 Consequently, prosecutors are able to decide, without any 
opportunity for challenge from the defense, whether they would like to 
handicap defendants’ abilities to mount a case.2 The Court has certainly not 
been uniformly vigilant in maintaining a level playing field between 
prosecutors and defense lawyers,3 but examining Kaley in isolation, it is 
difficult to explain the authorization of such an imbalance of power. 
Recognizing the strategic effect of freezing assets used to retain counsel, 
however, would have spotlighted the differences in the protections afforded 
to wealthy and indigent defendants. The opinion thus is more easily 
explained as an effort to obscure the realities of justice in a world of scarce 
resources than as an assessment of the appropriate use of prosecutorial 
power. 
Part I of this Essay surveys the background of forfeiture laws before 
and after Kaley v. United States. Part II then examines the Court’s 
problematic analysis that produced what seems like an unjust result. Part III 
argues that the majority in Kaley was driven by a desire to avoid focusing 
attention on an even larger injustice for which the Court could not provide 
a remedy. 
 
1 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014). 
2 See id. at 1107 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The possibility that a prosecutor could elect to 
hamstring his target by preventing him from paying his counsel of choice raises substantial concerns 
about the fairness of the entire proceeding.”). 
3 See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393 (1992) (describing 
powers the Supreme Court has given to prosecutors). 
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I. FREEZING ASSETS, FREEZING A DEFENSE 
A. Taking Title Through Forfeiture Laws 
Forfeiture laws enable the government to handicap criminal 
organizations by taking their profits and means of operations.4 The laws 
also present prosecutors with incredible strategic pretrial advantages.5 
Forfeiture allows the government to ultimately take title to assets that are 
the proceeds of criminal activity or have been used to facilitate criminal 
activity.6 These laws are of two types: civil and criminal. 
Civil forfeiture laws are proceedings against the property and require 
only a finding by the preponderance of the evidence.7 The offending 
property is taken so that individuals, or criminal organizations, may neither 
profit from the spoils of a crime, nor press the property back into service to 
commit further crimes.8 Criminal forfeiture laws punish the person by 
taking the property involved in criminal activity after a finding of guilt.9 
This forfeiture mechanism requires proof of criminal wrongdoing beyond a 
reasonable doubt.10 Although the burden is higher, prosecutors often opt for 
criminal forfeiture because a parallel civil forfeiture proceeding would 
allow the criminal defendant to depose many of the witnesses that the 
prosecution would call at trial.11 
Once a grand jury returns an indictment, federal prosecutors can 
 
4 See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27–28 (1983); Note, A Proposal to Reform Criminal 
Forfeiture Under RICO and CCE, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1929, 1935–36 (1984). 
5 See Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys’ Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to 
Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 765, 778–
79 (1989). 
6 Barclay Thomas Johnson, Note, Restoring Civility—the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 
2000: Baby Steps Towards a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35 IND. L. REV. 1045, 1048–52 
(2002). 
7 Id. at 1071–72. 
8 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 (1989); Russello, 464 U.S. at 
27–28. 
9 The admittedly punitive nature of criminal forfeitures has led to a recent debate about whether 
juries must find the facts specifically giving rise to criminal forfeiture. See Richard E. Finneran & 
Steven K. Luther, Criminal Forfeiture and the Sixth Amendment: The Role of the Jury at Common Law, 
35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 56–64 (2013) (concluding that a jury is not required to determine facts); 
Matthew R. Ford, Comment, Criminal Forfeiture and the Sixth Amendment’s Right to Jury Trial Post-
Booker, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1371 (2007) (concluding that there is a limited right to a jury’s 
determination of these facts). 
10 See Stefan D. Cassella, Does Apprendi v. New Jersey Change the Standard of Proof in Criminal 
Forfeiture Cases?, 89 KY. L.J. 631 (2001) (concluding that criminal forfeiture is a consequence of a 
conviction requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that no additional evidence beyond proof of 
the crime giving rise to the forfeiture must be demonstrated). 
11 See Susan R. Klein, Civil In Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy, 82 IOWA L. REV. 183, 225 
(1996) (recognizing that a prosecutor must obtain a stay of the civil proceedings when there are parallel 
civil forfeiture actions and criminal prosecutions, but noting that these stays are frequently granted). 
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obtain an ex parte order restraining assets traceable to the criminal conduct 
alleged if there is a “substantial probability” that the government will 
prevail in the forfeiture sought and if the property would be unavailable for 
forfeiture absent the requested restraint.12 Prior to the Kaley decision, a 
number of federal circuits held that the Sixth Amendment right to choice of 
counsel guaranteed a defendant the right to a hearing to challenge an order 
freezing assets intended to retain counsel.13 These courts concluded that 
defendants were permitted to challenge both the government’s claim that 
probable cause existed to believe that the defendant had committed the 
crimes giving rise to forfeiture and the claim that the frozen assets were 
traceable to the alleged crimes.14 
B. Kaley’s Facts and Holding 
In Kaley, the Supreme Court held that while a defendant could 
challenge the district court’s determination that the frozen assets were 
traceable to the defendant’s alleged crimes, he could not challenge the 
preliminary determination that he had committed the alleged crimes.15 
Justice Kagan’s majority opinion concluded that the grand jury’s finding of 
probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crime giving rise to 
forfeiture was sufficient to justify pretrial restraint of all assets traceable to 
the alleged crime, even if the assets would be used to fund the defendant’s 
constitutionally protected right to choice of counsel.16 
The facts in Kaley presented a compelling reason for allowing an 
adversarial hearing on the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the restraint 
of assets. Brian and Kerri Kaley were charged in a scheme to steal and sell 
medical devices.17 Kerri was employed by a subsidiary of Johnson & 
Johnson.18 She and her husband, Brian, obtained and sold medical devices, 
discarded by hospitals, which had initially been purchased from Kerri’s 
employer.19 The Government sought and obtained a pretrial protective 
 
12 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (2012). 
13 See United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2008), abrogated by Kaley v. 
United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014); United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 806 (4th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Michelle’s Lounge, 39 F.3d 684, 700–01 (7th Cir. 1994), abrogated by Kaley, 134 S. 
Ct. 1090; United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1197–98 (2d Cir. 1991), abrogated by Kaley, 134 
S. Ct. 1090; United States v. Roth, 912 F.2d 1131, 1333 (9th Cir. 1990). 
14 See, e.g., E-Gold, 521 F.3d at 421. 
15 134 S. Ct. at 1105. 
16 Id. at 1097–1100. 
17 Id. at 1095. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 1105 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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order over the proceeds of the sales of these devices.20 The Kaleys 
requested a hearing to contest the restraint of these assets, claiming there 
was no theft and thus no basis for freezing the assets—assets they planned 
to use to pay their lawyers in the case the Government had brought against 
them.21 
Others were prosecuted as part of this alleged scheme. Two entered 
guilty pleas, though the district court judges who took their pleas expressed 
substantial concerns that there were no victims of this alleged theft as the 
hospital owned the property and willingly gave it to the Kaleys.22 Another 
defendant took her case to trial with her choice of counsel, as the 
Government did not seek to restrain any of her assets, and was acquitted.23 
II. THE PROBLEMATIC DECISION 
A. The Fallacy of the Grand Jury 
Justice Kagan relied on longstanding respect for the grand jury’s role 
as an independent protector against unjust prosecution to conclude that 
judges were not permitted to second-guess a finding of probable cause to 
believe assets were subject to forfeiture.24 Commentators, however, have 
long rejected the premise of the independent role of the grand jury. It is 
frequently recognized that the modern grand jury is an investigatory tool of 
prosecutors.25 Grand juries meet in secret, and the only advice on the law 
they receive comes from the prosecutors in the room with them.26 The 
standard of proof in these proceedings is remarkably low. Cases are 
 
20 Id. at 1106. 
21 Id.  
22 Brief for Petitioners at 8–11, Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014) (No. 12-464). 
23 Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1106–07 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
24 Id. at 1097 (majority opinion) (“[T]he whole history of the grand jury institution demonstrates 
that a challenge to the reliability or competence of the evidence supporting a grand jury’s finding of 
probable cause will not be heard.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 54 (1992))). 
25 The former Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals once famously noted that a 
prosecutor could get a grand jury to “indict a ham sandwich.” See Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena of 
Stewart, 545 N.Y.S. 2d 974, 977 n.1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 
260, 323 (1995) (concluding that in most cases, defendants “would be just as well off without the grand 
jury as [they are] with it”); David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without 
Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 
683, 690 (2006) (observing that the grand jury plays no role in protecting the accused); Kevin K. 
Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2353 (2008) (observing frequent 
criticisms of grand jury independence). 
26 See Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1, 29–33 (2004) (describing the procedures and processes that leave prosecutors in all-but-
complete control of the work of the grand jury). 
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permitted to go forward against defendants if only twelve of as many as 
twenty-three grand jurors determine that probable cause exists.27 
Mathematically, the probable cause standard for a grand jury is therefore 
lower than it is for a judge.28 A judge must believe probable cause exists to 
issue a warrant.29 Only slightly greater than half the members of the grand 
jury must believe probable cause exists to return an indictment. 
Nevertheless, as Justice Kagan observed, a grand jury’s finding of 
probable cause creates substantial consequences for individuals indicted. 
An indicted defendant is forced to proceed to trial “with all the economic, 
reputational, and personal harm that entails.”30 A defendant arrested on the 
basis of a grand jury indictment is not entitled to an adversarial 
determination of probable cause—a right to which the defendant is 
constitutionally entitled if arrested in the absence of an indictment, with or 
without a warrant.31 The Supreme Court has recognized the limited 
protection grand juries provide. States are constitutionally permitted to use 
an information as the charging instrument (which is, of course, nothing 
more than a prosecutor’s assertion that probable cause exists) in lieu of an 
indictment by a grand jury if they so choose.32 
Restraining a defendant’s property at the start of a criminal 
prosecution is a significant burden in an already burdensome process. A 
pretrial restraint of assets absolutely prevents the use of frozen assets, but a 
finding of probable cause does not necessarily involve pretrial detention. 
The Constitution prohibits excessive bail,33 and many defendants are freed 
on bond prior to trial.34 Bond hearings limit the degree of the prosecution’s 
power to restrain a defendant prior to a final determination of guilt. By 
contrast, the restraint of assets is binary: either they are restrained or they 
are not. This absolute restraint on assets is significant because it impairs 
 
27 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a)(1), (f). 
28 Uzi Segal and Alex Stein have observed that there is some predictive value to the number of 
grand jurors who vote to indict. Quite logically, the fewer who vote to indict, the more likely the 
defendant is to be acquitted at trial. See Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal 
Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1531–32 (2006). 
29 Though, of course, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[a] magistrate’s determination of 
probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 
(1983) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)). 
30 Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1098 (2014). 
31 Id. at 1097 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975)). 
32 This has been true since the earliest days of the Supreme Court’s consideration of state court 
procedures. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884). 
33 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
34 The Supreme Court has never recognized a right to bail, however, and pretrial detention is 
increasingly the norm. See Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail, 
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 909, 915 (2013). 
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defendants’ ability to select their counsel of choice, a well-established 
constitutional right of the accused in a criminal prosecution.35 
The Kaley majority’s analysis is problematic for an additional, more 
technical reason. The forfeiture statutes themselves do not make a grand 
jury’s determination of probable cause dispositive of the government’s 
power to freeze a defendant’s assets. A judge reviewing a request for a 
protective order must conclude that there is a “substantial probability” that 
the government will prevail on the forfeiture to freeze the assets.36 Whether 
substantial probability in this context means something more than 
“probable cause,” it is clearly a differently worded standard, suggesting 
that a grand jury’s determination of probable cause does not conclusively 
establish that this standard has been met. The Court’s description of the 
Kaleys’ requested hearing as an effort to relitigate a grand jury 
determination shows that the Court missed this technical, yet important 
point. The Kaleys were actually seeking reconsideration of what should be 
a judicial determination in which the defendants were not permitted to 
participate. 
B. The Narrowly Drawn Issue 
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to recognize a right to be heard on 
the restraint of a defendant’s assets may ironically have been precisely 
because of the right to choice of counsel implicated by the government’s ex 
parte request for a protective order. The issue before the Court was not 
whether the government has a right to freeze all of the assets traceable to 
the crimes for which a grand jury found probable cause. Many lower courts 
had concluded that a defendant’s right to counsel of choice renders a grand 
jury’s determination of probable cause insufficient to restrain those assets 
that would be used to fund counsel if the defendant requested a hearing on 
the government’s right to restrain the assets.37 If a judge at such a hearing 
found no probable cause to believe the defendant was guilty of any crime, 
only those funds that would be used to pay counsel would be released.38 
 
35 As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his dissent, “‘the right to select counsel of one’s choice [is at] 
the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee’ of the Sixth Amendment.” Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1107 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006)). 
36 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (2012). 
37 See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
38 As Justice Kagan observed at oral argument, the government seldom lost these hearings, thus 
few courts had been confronted with the difficult question of how much money to release to fund one’s 
representation. See Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Asset Forfeiture Case is a Close Call, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 16, 2013, 4:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/10/argument-analysis-asset-
forfeiture-case-is-close-call/ [http://perma.cc/45UW-NDRF]. The Supreme Court’s recognition of the 
right to have these funds released would have, however, raised the profile of the issue and potentially 
forced the Court itself to take on the question of how to determine how much retained counsel should 
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It is understandable that when lower courts granted hearings on 
pretrial restraint of potentially forfeitable assets, they limited the scope of 
the hearing to those assets that would be used to fund counsel.39 There was 
more compelling authority for a court to second-guess a restraining order 
for assets that would be used to retain counsel than for assets a defendant 
would use for other purposes. The Constitution specifically mentions the 
right to counsel, and the Supreme Court has recognized a defendant’s 
presumptive right to choice of counsel.40 Due process does require 
protection be in place to prevent even temporary erroneous deprivations,41 
but there is no specific constitutional right to fund a vacation, college 
education, mortgage, grocery bill, or any other use of the assets. Further, if 
a defendant is acquitted, any frozen assets will be released and the 
defendant may use the assets for most any purpose, except hiring a lawyer 
for the trial—that ship will have sailed. Finally, as Chief Justice Roberts 
observed in his Kaley dissent, there is a particular concern that “a 
prosecutor could elect to hamstring his target by preventing him from 
paying his counsel of choice . . . .”42 
Precisely because the issue before the Supreme Court dealt only with 
the restraint of assets used to retain counsel, the Kaley case threatened to 
place too fine a point on the role of money in the representation of a 
criminal defendant. The Kaleys did not claim the right to a hearing to 
determine the legitimacy of a restraint placed on all of the assets traceable 
to the alleged wrongdoing, but only the right to a hearing with a much more 
limited scope. A judge’s finding at such a hearing that there was no 
probable cause to believe the Kaleys were involved in criminal conduct 
would have effectively concluded that the prosecution of the Kaleys was 
inappropriate and the restraint of any of their assets unlawful. The 
consequences of success at the hearing they requested, however, would 
have been considerably more modest. The trial against them certainly 
would have gone forward, unless the prosecution voluntarily dismissed the 
case. Additionally, only the frozen assets they would use to fund their 
 
be paid. 
39 See United States v. E-Gold, Ltd.¸ 521 F.3d 411, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (recognizing the 
defendant’s right to an adversary hearing on restraint of assets “at least in a case in which they have 
demonstrated the inability to retain counsel of their choice without access to the seized assets”), 
abrogated by Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014); United States v. Michelle’s Lounge, 39 
F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[I]f the defendant successfully rebuts the government’s showing of 
probable cause and the government cannot or chooses not to bring forth additional evidence, due 
process requires that sufficient assets be released to remedy the deprivation of assets needed to pay a 
defense attorney’s reasonable fees.”), abrogated by Kaley, 134 S. Ct. 1090. 
40 Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988). 
41 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340 (1976). 
42 134 S. Ct. at 1107 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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defense would have been released, even though the success at such a 
hearing would imply that all of the assets should be released. 
III. DODGING A STANDARD 
The Supreme Court’s recognition of a right to a hearing limited to a 
challenge of pretrial seizure of assets used to retain counsel would have 
necessitated standards to determine which portion of seized assets should 
be released to retain counsel. Under what is known as the relation-back 
doctrine, the government takes title to forfeitable assets at the time they 
become tainted (either when they facilitate a crime or are obtained through 
the commission of a crime).43 The assets are restrained because the 
government claims to have a superior claim to the property. A judicial 
finding of no probable cause to restrain the assets required to retain counsel 
would do nothing to the temporary hold over assets the government 
claimed as its own that were not being used to retain counsel. Courts would 
thus have to determine which portion of those frozen assets would be used 
to fund the defense, and only those funds could be released. 
In broad terms, there were only two possible standards to determine 
what funds could be released. Courts could either release the same amount 
of money as for the representation of an indigent defendant or turn to 
another method of calculation. Under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 
indigent criminal defendants are assigned to public defenders or lawyers on 
a CJA list, who are compensated at the rate of $125 per hour.44 Federal 
Public Defender offices have investigators on staff, but should CJA-
appointed attorneys require investigators, they must apply to the court for 
funding. Federal judges, in approving payment for appointed counsel and 
approving requests for investigators, essentially decide whether the 
defendant’s need for counsel and investigative services justifies taking the 
requested funds from the public treasury. Courts would surely face a 
similar choice when asked to consider whether the defense requires access 
to funds in which the government claims a superior interest. 
Upon a defendant’s showing that there was no probable cause, if 
judges released only the funds that would be provided to indigent counsel, 
they would effectively be denying (or at least severely restricting) the 
defendant’s choice of counsel, while still requiring him to foot a bill that 
would otherwise be covered by the government. Alternatively, if courts 
released a greater amount of money to defendants whose assets had been 
 
43 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c); United States v. Lazarenko, 476 F.3d 642, 652 (9th Cir. 2007). 
44 See Joanna Jacobbi Lydgate, Comment, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation 
Streamline, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 481, 506 n.160 (2010) (describing the history of compensation rates for 
federal public defenders). 
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restrained as subject to forfeiture, they would be implicitly recognizing the 
existence of two criminal justice systems: one for the rich and one for the 
poor. Further, by recognizing that a defendant has a legitimate need for 
assets greater than those that would be provided to an indigent defendant, 
courts would call into question the adequacy of representation by those 
whose funding was more limited. The Supreme Court has taken great pains 
to avoid establishing standards for criminal representation. The Court 
specifically declined to define the standard for criminal representation 
beyond “reasonably effective assistance” in Strickland v. Washington,45 and 
at no point has the Court even hinted that the Constitution requires an 
indigent defendant be provided with any level of funding for his defense. 
And the Court has steered clear of any suggestion that indigent defendants 
are entitled to have their lawyers adequately compensated.46 
Public defenders at the state and federal level are often excellent 
lawyers, and perform remarkably well given the restraints on their time and 
the limited access to investigators.47 Federal public defenders, with much 
smaller caseloads than state public defenders and higher compensation than 
most of their state counterparts, often perform extraordinary services for 
their clients.48 Nevertheless, the amount of time a well-compensated lawyer 
can spend on a case is typically much greater than that of a public defender. 
The record of appointed lawyers is considerably more mixed than the 
record of public defenders, especially on the state level, where low per-
hour rates and limits placed on the maximum fee an appointed lawyer can 
receive for representation are common.49 
To have recognized the right to have only a portion of the funds 
frozen released because the seizure lacked probable cause would have 
highlighted the reality that indigent defendants do not receive the funds that 
judges find appropriate for private representation. Ironically, a stronger 
 
45 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). 
46 See Jessa DeSimone, Comment, Bucking Conventional Wisdom: The Montana Public Defender 
Act, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1479, 1483 (2006) (observing that “the Supreme Court has not 
specified exactly what type of indigent defense systems states must provide”). Payment for court-
appointed counsel in state cases, even in capital cases, is abysmal. One study, detailing particularly bad 
representative examples, showed that lawyers in Virginia, after overhead, were compensated at the rate 
of $13 an hour, while lawyers in a Texas case received a total of $800 for handling capital cases. Sanjay 
K. Chhablani, Chronically Stricken: A Continuing Legacy of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 28 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 387 (2009).  
47 See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 
58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 92–93 (1995) (extolling the virtues of the services rendered by the 
D.C. Public Defender Service). 
48 See Zachary Cloud, Note, The Problem of Low Crime: Constitutionally Inadequate Criminal 
Defense in Rural America, 22 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 403, 420 (2013) (observing that “some of the most 
widely-respected criminal defense attorneys work as federal public defenders”). 
49 See id. at 413–15. 
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defense claim would have created a lesser tension for the Court. The 
defendants in Kaley did not argue that they had a right to challenge the 
seizure of all of the assets frozen by a grand jury’s determination that there 
was probable cause to believe the funds were tainted by criminal activity. A 
federal judge finding that the grand jury incorrectly found probable cause 
would simply return all of the assets seized. 
Courts tend to avoid decisions that reveal inevitable tensions between 
our fundamental values and the practical limits on our ability to preserve 
those values.50 Judge Calabresi, prior to his appointment to the bench, once 
explained, as paraphrased by Professor David Shapiro, that scholars are to 
“‘think, lucidly and openly,’ about the issues,” while “the judge must act in 
a manner sensitive to political and other realities and thus may opt for 
something less, or at least different” than complete candor.51 
Doctrines of criminal procedure are replete with efforts to hide our 
unattainable virtues and unenforceable limitations. The paradox of pretrial 
detention is an excellent example. In United States v. Salerno, Justice 
Marshall criticized the majority for permitting pretrial detention on the 
basis of a suspect’s dangerousness.52 According to Marshall, pretrial 
detention is indistinguishable from punishment, and punishment is 
constitutionally permitted only upon conviction.53 Unable, or unwilling, to 
quarrel with the maxim that punishment requires a previous conviction, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion instead defined away the difficulty. The 
majority concluded that not all incarceration amounts to punishment.54 
Consistent with congressional intent, pretrial incarceration is regulatory, 
not punitive, and thus detention prior to conviction is not inconsistent with 
our fundamental values.55 
 
50 Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt have observed that society at large is equally reluctant to 
draw attention to the fact that scarcity of resources defies our ability to achieve values we identify as 
absolute. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). 
51 See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 731 (1987) 
(quoting GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 181 (1982)). The virtues and 
appropriate limits on judicial candor have been thoroughly debated in the academic community. See 
Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995). 
52 481 U.S. 739, 762–64 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 748 (majority opinion). 
55 Id. at 747. Justice Marshall’s opinion was equally unable to offer a completely consistent theory. 
Justice Marshall admitted, as he had to, that pretrial detention had long been permitted to prevent flight 
and this type of detention definitionally occurred prior to a conviction. Id. at 762 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). Justice Marshall also raised a practical concern that prosecutors could use the threat of 
pretrial detention strategically to extract cooperation. Id. at 757–58. The logical extension of this 
concern is that there should be some sort of judicial oversight over the use of prosecutorial charging 
decisions to extract concessions from the defendant during the plea bargaining process, something 
Justice Marshall expressly rejected in United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979). 
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Similarly, racially motivated investigations, prosecutions, or sentences 
are obviously contrary to constitutional values. Yet, practical realities often 
prevent remedies for improperly motivated law enforcement, prosecution, 
and punishment. For example, Whren v. United States involved a difficult-
to-refute claim that officers stopped the defendant’s car because he fit a 
racial profile.56 In United States v. Armstrong, a defendant claimed that 
African-Americans were disproportionately prosecuted for crack cocaine 
offenses.57 The statistics in McCleskey v. Kemp showed that the race of the 
victim and the race of the defendant were statistically significant in 
determining which murderers in Georgia were sentenced to death.58 
Recognizing a constitutional violation in each case would not have been 
difficult, but fashioning a remedy would have been nearly impossible. The 
defendants had not claimed that authorities had no right to stop, prosecute, 
or execute them. Rather, they each claimed that the authorities were more 
inclined to exercise their discretion to act against defendants on the basis of 
race and that others had improperly been given a pass. The only remedy for 
the issues each raised would be to order officers and prosecutors to use 
their discretion more equitably, perhaps meaning they could only comply 
with the judgment by stopping more white motorists, prosecuting more 
white crack dealers, and executing more murderers of black victims. In 
short, the remedies for these complaints would be nearly impossible to 
monitor and enforce. Rather than recognize an unconstitutional motivation 
was afoot, yet deny relief, the Court in each of these cases concluded that 
there was inadequate proof of an improper motive, or denied that such a 
motive was relevant. Legislatures, city councils, prosecutors’ offices and 
police departments are in a position to improve equality of enforcement, 
but a court recognizing unequal treatment in each of these circumstances to 
be unconstitutional would have been powerless to do anything about it. The 
conflict between our fundamental values and the practical inability to 
remedy the problem was thus avoided. 
CONCLUSION 
A decision in Kaley requiring courts to release assets for the use of 
privately retained counsel would have exposed the ugly underbelly of the 
criminal justice system. Courts cannot fashion doctrines ensuring indigent 
defendants receive the equivalent quality of representation that the wealthy 
are able to obtain, and legislatures lack the funding to ensure that appointed 
 
56 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). 
57 517 U.S. 456, 459 (1996). 
58 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987). 
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lawyers are as well compensated as highly paid private attorneys. Just as it 
has done in other contexts, the Court avoided an ugly reality by denying 
that a constitutional right existed. 
Justice Kagan’s opinion is not lacking in candor—she observed that 
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system would be compromised by a 
prosecution in the face of a judicial finding that there was no probable 
cause supporting the prosecution. As she described: 
[S]uppose the judge performed that task and came to the opposite conclusion. 
Two inconsistent findings would then govern different aspects of one criminal 
proceeding: Probable cause would exist to bring the Kaleys to trial (and, if 
otherwise appropriate, to hold them in prison), but not to restrain their 
property. And assuming the prosecutor continued to press the charges, the 
same judge who found probable cause lacking would preside over a trial 
premised on its presence. That legal dissonance, if sustainable at all, could 
not but undermine the criminal justice system’s integrity—and especially the 
grand jury’s integral, constitutionally prescribed role.59 
A different ruling, however, would have required lower courts to 
engage in far greater candor. Affording the Kaleys relief would have been 
the first step in creating doctrines to openly operate separate systems of 




59 Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1099 (2014) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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